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STATEMENT OlMIIKIKIkU "I'lON
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. Appellant appeals from the final order of Third District Court, Salt Lake
Department, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, granting judgment in favor of appellee Brian
James Messerich and Annika Falkenrath Messerich. The instant appeal was commenced in the Utah
Court of Appeals on or about the 12th day of March, 2008 with jurisdiction conferred upon that court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR RE1!TEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No, 1: Did the District Court (Hilder) have jurisdiction to grant Appellee an order
terminating appellant's parental rights. STANDARD < *F REVIEW: "When a motion to vacate a
judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction
is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs.
Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate,
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court" Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110. In the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the
appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review.
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions
of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions.
Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite. Inc., 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896
P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by hearing the case or not
remanding the case for further hearing to hear the evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue
regarding a conclusion of law is reviewed with a correction of error standard. Statev.Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994), The trial court's findings of face are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst 846 P.2d 1282,1286 (Utah 1993) and Mensies v. Galetka, 2006
UT 81. Questions ofjurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed
for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v.
Insure-Rite.Inc 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez. 896 P.2d 38,39 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err and abused its discretion by not looking beyond the plain
language of the relinquishment statute, Utah Code Ann. 78-30-4.20, to legislative history and public
policy to ascertain the statutes' intent. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A trial court has discretion in
determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial
court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110. More specifically, in the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion,
the appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review.
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. See also Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah
1993).Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law thai are reviewed
for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v.
Insure-Rite.Inc, 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38,39 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
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Issue No. 4: Whether the court abused its discretion by not looking to legislative
intent and finding that Section 78-30-4.20 applies not only to an unmarried biological father but to
a natural father who was married to the natural mother at the time of adoption. STANDARD OF
REVIEW:: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b)
grounds], and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of
discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110. More specifically, in
the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the appellate court reviews a district court's findings
of fact under a clear error standard of review. Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. In this case, the trial
court abused its discretion by not looking beyond the language of the statute and to legislative intent
to determine if 78-30-4.20 applies to not only an unmarried biological father, but also to a natural
father who was married to the natural mother at the time of the adoption. Questions of jurisdiction
and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no
particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT
App 347, 37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah U. App. 1995).
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not considering the
best interest of the children. STANDARD OF REVIEW: : "A trial court has discretion in
determining whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial
court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110. More specifically, in the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion,
the appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review.
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by not looking
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beyond the language of the statute and to legislative intent to determine the best interest of the
children.
Issue No, 6: Whether the court abused its discretion by finding that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel, waiver and laches do not prevent enforcement of appellant's
relinquishment. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "A trial court has discretion in determining whether
a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only
when there has been an abuse of discretion." Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT
App 110. More specifically, in the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the appellate court
reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review. Mensies v. Galetka,
2006 UT 81. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by not looking beyond the language
of the statute and to legislative intent to determine the best interest of the children.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The statutory authorities listed above in the Table of Authorities are either determinative in
this appeal or are of such central importance as to merit their inclusion herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from an order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, the
Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, denying Petitioner's Motion to Vacate or Reconsider.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

The parties, Brandon Sieverts and Annika Falkenrath Messerich, are the parents of the minor
children: Rex Bryant Falkenrath Sieverts, date of birth 16 August, 2002; Reagan Elizabeth
Falkenrath Sieverts, date ofbirth 16 August, 2002; Andrew Marcus Falkenrath Sieverts, date of birth
4

23 January, 2004; and Orion Jeremy Falkenrath Sieverts, date of birth 23 January, 2004.
The parents of the children divorced in August 2005. The Decree of Divorce between Mr.
Sieverts and Ms. Messerich was signed by Judge Peuler on August 26, 2005, and entered in the
Registry of Judgements on August 29, 2005.
Less than one month later, on September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts signed an "Affidavit and
Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father" (Affidavit) and agreed that the children could
be adopted by the mother's fiance. On that same date, Mr. Sieverts signed a Stipulation to modify
the divorce Decree (before a notary public), which Stipulation incorporated the Affidavit and
requested the Court to acknowledge the relinquishment, but nevertheless preserved the children's
right to support prospectively.
On October 14, 2005, Judge Peuler rejected the Stipulation and denied the request for
modification. Judge Peuler stated two cogent reasons for her refusal. First, Judge Peuler noted that,
"[a] relinquishment of parental rights may occur only in the District Court in the context of an
adoption proceeding. It may not occur in a divorce action." There was no adoption proceeding
pending in October, 2005, nor could there have been because Appellee had not remarried. The effect
of Judge Peuler's first conclusion was that she had no jurisdiction to act on any termination of rights.
Judge Peuler provided a second reason for declining to approve the Stipulation and modify the
Decree; namely, her determination that it did not appear to be in the best interests of the children to
leave them without a father figure for any interim period between a termination or relinquishment
of rights, and an adoption by a stepparent. Judge Peuler ordered that "The Decree of Divorce of
Divorce remains in full force and effect, without modification."

5

The next activity also occurred in the divorce case; namely, Mr. Sieverts filed a Rule 60(b)
Motion in relation to their Decree of Divorce on or about November 23, 2005. After an exchange
of Affidavits and argument before Commissioner Evans, the Commissioner recommended that the
Motion be denied. Mr. Sieverts filed a timely Objection to the recommendation, .and Judge Peuler
ultimately held three days' of evidentiary hearings regarding the Motion, resulting in her Minute
Entry of July 26, 2006, denying the Motion.
It is clear from the record that both at the time that Mr. Sieverts signed the Affidavit and the
Stipulation to Modify the Decree, as well as at the time of the filing of the Rule 60(b) Motion, there
was, in fact, no prospective stepparent identified by Ms. Messerich.
Subsequent to the divorce, the mother Appellee married Brian Messerich on February 10,
2007. Mr. Sieverts, the natural father, continued to visit with the children and pay child support
following Appellee's remarriage to Mr. Messerich. In fact, Mr. Sieverts visited the children
significantly more than he was entitled to under the Decree of Divorce and continued to pay child
support. In addition to Mr. Sieverts' discussions with Appellee and Appellee's actions, Mr. Sieverts'
had a very reasonable expectation that visitation would continue in accordance with the parties'
Decree of Divorce based on Judge Peuler's October 15, 2005 ruling.
On April 30,2007, less than three months after Appellee's remarriage, she filed a Petition
to Determine Parental Rights. The Court's records indicate that a separate action, case number
072900213, was filed as an adoption proceeding on the same date by Brian and Annika Messerich.
That action is presently assigned to Judge John Paul Kennedy.
The Petition to Determine Parental Rights was assigned to Judge Peuler, the same Judge who
was assigned to the divorce action between the mother and father. Counsel for the petitioner sought
6

entry of an Order Terminating Rights, based on the existing Affidavit and Waiver, Consent and
Relinquishment of Legal Father, signed by Mr. Sieverts in 2005. On April 30, 2007, Judge Peuler
was apparently unavailable to review the document. At that time, Judge Peuler was Presiding Judge
to this District, and Judge Hilder was the Associate Presiding Judge. The Petition and proposed
Order was brought to Judge Hilder in his capacity as Associate Presiding Judge, and he signed the
Order Terminating Rights based on the Affidavit and Waiver executed by Mr. Sieverts in 2005. Mr.
Sieverts did not receive any notice regarding this action. From that time to present Mr. Sieverts has
not been afforded any visitation and contact with the children.
On or about June 6,2007, Judge Hilder received a short letter from Mr. Sieverts, objecting
to the termination of his parental rights. Mr. Sieverts sent the letter after hearing that the court
entered the Order Terminating Rights. Mr. Sieverts letter was the first time Judge Hilder became
aware of either the divorce action, or Judge Peuler's prior determination in 2005. As Judge Hilder's
Minute Entry of June 10, 2007, indicates, he consulted briefly With Judge Peuler, and they agreed
that because Judge Hilder signed the Order, he should consider any objection to the Order. The
Minute Entry also indicates that Judge Hilder chose to treat the letter as a Motion to Reconsider or
Vacate the Order.
Judge Hilder agreed to consider Mr. Sieverts' Objection. Mr. Sieverts retained counsel,
Stephen R. Cook, and both sides briefed the issue before the Court. After a delay, oral argument
was heard on August 29, 2007, and Judge Hilder took the matter under advisement. Judge Hilder
issued a Tentative Ruling and Request for Additional Briefing on October 30, 2007. The
attorneys submitted their additional briefing. Judge Hilder issued his Ruling on February 18,
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2008. Mr. Sieverts subsequently filed this timely appeal appealing the denial of his Motion to
Reconsider or Vacate the Order.
C.

DISPOSITION AT HEARING

The District Court ruled as follows:
1.

Petitioner's Motion to Vacate or Reconsider was denied.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial judge erred when he did not immediately grant Mr. Sieverts' Motion to Reconsider
or Vacate and when he ultimately denied Mr. Sieverts' Motion to Reconsider or Vacate, thus
upholding Appellee's Petition to Determine Parental Rights and the Order Terminating Rights. This
court should reverse the trial court's Ruling and remand with instructions to vacate the
relinquishment and Order Terminating Rights and bar Appellees from enforcing the Relinquishment
on these grounds.
Judge Hilder's Ruling denying Mr. Sieverts his parental rights is plain error. The trial court
should have set aside Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment and waiver for adoption because the court did not
have grounds and jurisdiction to consider the matter and enter the Order on April 30, 2007. The
Court's Ruling improperly overturned Judge Peuler's Ruling where she had already denied the
Relinquishment and Waiver and ruled the original Decree of Divorce remain in full force and effect.
Mr. Sieverts relied on this and continued his relationship with his children, including paying child
support and spending time with the children in excess of that allowed in the parties' decree. This
court should reverse the trial courts Ruling and Order Terminating Rights and remand with
instructions to grant Mr. Sieverts' motion and vacate the relinquishment and restore Appellant's
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parental rights in accordance with the parties Decree of Divorce and Judge Peuler' s Order of October
15, 2005 on these grounds.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE PROPER
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CASE AND TERMINATE
APPELLANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS

The trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear this matter and terminate appellant's
parental rights. "When a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of
jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot
stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs. Therefore, the propriety
of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question
of law upon which we do not defer to the district court" Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110. In the contest of a denial of a rule 60 (b) motion, the appellate
court reviews a district court's findings of fact under a clear error standard of review.
Mensies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower
court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d
1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the trial court
abused its discretion by not immediately granting Appellant's Motion to Vacate or
Reconsider and by hearing the case.

Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge Hilder

9

relied on the Petition of Appellee and the terms of the relinquishment and affidavit and
statutory provisions.
Judge Hilder improperly reversed Judge Peuler's prior Order in making his Ruling,
thus violating the "law of the case" doctrine. As noted, Judge Peuler rejected the Appellee's
request to recognize and enter the relinquishment to terminate Appellant's parental rights on
October 14,2005. Appellee filed the exact same relinquishment and waiver papers signed
by Appellant in 2005 as she did in this action petitioning the court to determine parental
rights again on April 30,2007. This time she did it without any notice to Appellant. Judge
Hilder improperly accepted Appellee's Petition and signed her proposed Order eind reversed
Judge Peuler's prior Order, thus violating the "law of the case" doctrine. The Utah Supreme
Court stated: "We have repeatedly indicated that one district court judge cannot overrule
another district court judge of equal authority." Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938, 946-47
(Utah 1987). Mascaro v. Davis further notes that "law of the case doctrine" is consistent
with Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-19 and § 78-7-20 that prohibits subsequent applications to a
court for an order which has been denied or granted conditionally by another judge. 741 P.2d
at 947. The only exceptions to this rule are not relevant here. The issue was not presented
in a "different light" as when further discovery changes the propriety of summary judgement.
Red Flame v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, 996 P.2d 540, 542. Nor was there "change in the
relevant law" or evidence that Judge Peuler's prior order was "clearly erroneous." Id. Here,
Appellee had remarried less than three months prior to her refiling her request with the court,
but that would not qualify Appellee and her husband to adopt the children under the law.
(See discussion regarding adoption and relinquishment herein). The issue was therefore not
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presented in a different light. Mr. Sieverts, the natural father, continued to visit with the
children and pay child support following Judge Peuler's decision in 2005 and Appellee's
remarriage to Mr. Messerich. In fact, Mr. Sieverts visited the children significantly more
than he was entitled to under the Decree of Divorce and continued to pay child support.
Visitation and Mr. Sieverts' involvement in the children's life continued in accordance with
the parties' Decree of Divorce as ordered by Judge Peuler's oft October 15,2005. "The law
of the case doctrine is employed to avoid delay and prevent injustice." Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Construction. 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Here Judge Hilder created
injustice by not granting Mr. Sieverts' motion and entering his ruling terminating Mr.
Sieverts' parental rights. The Decree of Divorce of Divorce should have remained in foil
force and effect, without modification. In the least, Appellee's adoption case should have
been dismissed or consolidated with this case and heard on ttie merits.
Because of Judge Hilder's error in not immediately granting Mr. Sieverts' Motion to
Vacate, Mr. Sieverts has been deprived of any visitation with his children as provided in the
Decree, which includes the deprivation of developing a relationship and bond with his
children and enjoying that love and affection. He has continued to pay child support, yet lost
out on the reduction in child support he was entitled to under the Decree for extended
visitation pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.11. Mr. Sieverts was required to retain counsel and
spend unnecessary time and money arguing his motion that should have been immediately
granted.
Additionally, Judge Hilder heavily relied on certain provisions of the adoptions
statute in his Ruling, yet ignored the most important and applicable provision as it relates to
11

this case and jurisdiction. Pursuant to Utah law regarding step-parent adoption, the law
requires that the children reside in the home with the proposed stepfather for at least one
year. See U.C.A. §78-30-14(7)(b). Furthermore, pursuant to Utah law, a relinquishment of
parental rights may only occur in the District Court in the context of an adoption proceeding.
In this case, the appellees were not married for one year prior to filing their Petition to
Determine Parental Rights, therefore, there were not proper grounds for the Court to consider
Appellee's motion and the subsequent arguments. Furthermore, U.C.A.. §78-30-4.16 (2)(b)
provides that "If there are not proper grounds to terminate the person's parental rights, the
court shall: (iii) award custody of the child in accordance with the child's best interest." The
district court took no evidence regarding the children's best interests, and in fact stated,
"there is no need for judicial inquiry into the best interests of the children." (Judge
Hider'sRuling, Page 5). Here, the District Court should have ordered the parties' Divorce
Decree remain in full force and effect, as was done by Judge Peuler on October 15, 2005,
when she denied the relinquishment pursuant to the Stipulation filed by Appellee.
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear this matter and terminate appellant's
parental rights. Judge Hilder's Ruling cannot stand without denying due process to
Appellant. The trial court abused its discretion by not immediately granting Appellant's
Motion to Vacate or Reconsider.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY NOT REMANDING THE CASE FOR
FURTHER HEARING TO HEAR THE EVIDENCE
Judge Hilder inappropriately accepted Appellee's Petition and proposed Order
12

inconsistent with Utah law. Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge Hilder relied on
the terms of the relinquishment and affidavit and statutory provisions.
Even though Sieverts' relinquishment "was effective when signed" Utah Code
Annotated § 78-30-4.20, Sieverts' rights and responsibilities are not terminated until the
adoption decree is entered under Utah law:
The birth parents of an adopted child are, from time to time the final
decree of adotion is entered, released from all parental duties toward
and all responsibilities for the adopted child, and have no further
rights with regard to the child. Utah Code Ann §78-30-11.

The clear conclusion is that Mr. Sieverts' retains some ifrchoate rights until the decree
is entered. Moreover, Utah Statute permits "any interested party" to petition the court "for
a determination of the rights and interest of any person who may claim an interest in a child"
before an adoption petition is filed. Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.24. Accordingly, the
plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.24 permits his intervention. Sieverts
contends that he is an interested party based upon his blood relationship and adoption of the
minor children and the affection he developed for the children through living with them and
caring for them and providing substantial support for them after he signed the
relinquishment. Furthermore, the adoption statute further provides that "the court shall
examine each person appearing before it" and that "the court shall make a specific finding
regarding the best interest of the child

" Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-9. Because

Sieverts had relevant evidence about the interest of the children and the suitability of the
adoptive home, the court should have allowed him to be heard. While only parents have the
"right" to custody and notice, various other persons may be granted "standing" to be heard

13

regarding a child's custody. See Wilson v. Family Servs. Div. Region Two, 554 P.2d 227,
231 (Utah 1976) (Grandmother has "some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody
and welfare of the children who become parentless"). Utah courts have granted standing in
custody and adoption matters to various persons who, like Mr. Sieverts, have no right to
custody but have an interest in the child. Therefore, even if the court determined that Mr.
Sieverts relinquishment was effective when signed he should not be precluded from putting
forth evidence regarding the best interests of the children. (Judge Hilder's Ruling, Page 7).
Although Mr. Sieverts was entitled to the rights of a parent "he should have been seen as
having an interest in the proceeding." The Utah Supreme Court's general test for standing
first looks to whether the party has "a legally protected interest in the controversy" and can
show "some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of
the legal dispute." Kennecott Corp v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451,454, quoting Jenkins
v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145,1148,1150 (Utah 1983). "If the Plaintiff has no standing under the
first step, then he may have standing if no one has a greater interest then he and if the issue
is unlikely to be raised at all if the Plaintiff is denied standing." Id at 454 quoting Jenkins
675 P.2d at 1150. As stated above Sieverts rights and responsibilities are not terminated
until the adoption decree is entered under Utah law. (Utah Code Annotaled § 78-30-4.20).
Additionally, Mr. Sieverts continued, and continues to pay child support and interact with
the children, yet has been deprived visitation and developing a relationship with his children
since Judge Hilder granted Appellee's Petition.
The Utah Supreme Court thoroughly set forth considerations for granting standing
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in contested custody cases in State in Interest of JWF v. Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah
1990) (holding that a step-father had standing to seek custody of a child he had never
parented). The court concluded:
There is no reason to narrowly restrict participation in custodial proceedings.
Indeed, our case law and the legislatures pronouncements indicate that the
interests of the child are best served when those interested in the child are
permitted to assert that interest. The question of who should have custody of
the child is too important to exclude participants on narrowly drawn
technical grounds those who have legal or personal connections with the
child should not precluded from being heard on best interests. Id. 799 P.2d
at 716.
Mr. Sieverts should have had the opportunity to spe&k to the best interests of the
children under these standards given his rights and responsibilities are not terminated until
an adoption decree is entered, given the concern he has demonstrated for his children, given
the relationship he has for his children and given the support he has provided to his children.
The Utah Legislature has set forth the proper standard to protect the interests of the child
which the legislature has determined "should govern and be bf most concern." Utah Code
Annotated § 78-30-1.5. It makes sense, therefore, that the relinquishing parent should be
afforded the opportunity to put forth evidence on the best interest of the child because he or
she may be in the best position to discover that the adoptive family has certain undisclosed
weaknesses or inadequacies.
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY NOT LOOKING BEYOND
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE
RELINQUISHMENT STATUTE, UTAH CODE
ANN. 78-30-4.20, TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY TO ASCERTAIN THE
STATUTES' INTENT
The court erred in not looking beyond the plain language of the relinquishment
statute, Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.20, to legislative history and public policy to
ascertain the statutes intents. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower
court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d
1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Findings: Judge Hillder's
ruling makes the following pertinent findings with respect to legislative intent.

On

September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts executed a relinquishment petition and corresponding
affidavit.

Mr. Sieverts acted with deliberate clarity and full knowledge of the

relinquishment's effect and the ramifications stemming therefrom.
Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge Hilder relied on the terms of the
relinquishment and affidavit and statutory provisions, specifically Utah Code Annotated §
78-30-4.12 through § 78-30-4.20. The relinquishment and affidavit was the extent of
evidence submitted by Appellee in support of their position that Appellant's Motion to
Reconsider and Vacate should be denied and that the relinquishment was adequate under
Utah law.
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A relinquishment may be set aside for "fraud, undue influence and for good cause
shown

" In re Adoption of K, 465 P.2d 541, 542 (Utah 1970). Utah case law establishes

that "when consent is given in court before a judge, there is & presumption of regularity."
Matter of S.. 572 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1977). However, procedural irregularities also justify
setting aside a relinquishment. In Taylor v. Waddoups, 241 P.2d 157, 159 (Utah 1952) the
court set aside a relinquishment because it was signed before a notary public, not before a
judge, and a notary was no longer sanctioned by statute to take relinquishments. The Utah
Supreme Court held that there had been "no legal consent

given" under those

circumstances. Id. at 160. This procedural irregularity was later noted as "the most
important and controlling fact" in Taylor v. Waddoups by the Utah Supreme Court. In re
Adoption of D, 252 P.2d 223, 227 (Utah 1953). In this case no court was involved, rather
Appellant was baited into Appellee's attorneys' office to sign the relinquishment. When a
court was involved upon Appellee requesting it to recognize and enforce the relinquishment,
it refused to recognize it and ordered that the terms of the parties original decree remain in
full force and effect. (See above). Therefore, the trial court should have ruled that the
relinquishment may be set aside.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
NOT LOOKING TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND FINDING
THAT SECTION 78-30-4.20 APPLIES NOT ONLY TO AN
UNMARRIED BIOLOGICAL FATHER BUT TO A NATURAL
FATHER WHO WAS MARRIED TO THE NATURAL
MOTHER AT THE TIME OF ADOPTION.

The trial court erred by not looking to legislative intent and finding that § 78-30-4.20
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applies not only to unmarried biological fathers but to a natural father who was married to
the natural mother at the time of the adoption. The court erred in failing to grant Sieverts'
motion. Findings: Judge Hilder's ruling makes the following pertinent finding with respect
to statutory interpretation and whether the court should look behind the plain language
relinquishment statute. The court found the statutory language unequivocal and that the clear
statement that a relinquishment cannot be revoked reveals no ambiguity that would trigger
a need to look behind the plain language of the statute itself and consider legislative intent.
Questions ofjurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed
for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake
Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38,
39 (Utah Q. App. 1995).
A review of the adoption code reveals numerous sections that affect not only
unmarried biological fathers, but the rights of various adoption proceedings including the
birth mother, married biological fathers, unmarried biological fathers and guardians.
Furthermore, the court found that there is a fundamental policy underlying the adoption code
for permanency and finality and order to minimize effort, expense and emotional
involvement experienced in the process. Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge
Hilder relied on Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.14 to4.21 and Savage v. Utah Youth Bill.,
2004 UT 102 and Adams v. Swenson. 2005 UT 8 and Utah Pub. Employees Ass, NV State
2006 UT 9 and in re Adoption of F. 26 2d 255.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY NOT
CONSIDERING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN.
The trial court erred in failing to consider the best interests of the children.
The court found that the best interest standard only arises if the court determines that
consent has not been obtained. The court relied on Utah Code Annotated § 78-3 0-4.16(1 )(2)
in making this determination. Furthermore, the court found that if consent is not obtained
and there are not proper grounds to terminate parental rights, the court must dismiss the
adoption petition. Only then may the court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
custody based on a child's best interest. In making this finding the court relied on Utah Code
Annotated § 78-3-4.16 (2)(b). The court furthermore found that Mr. Sievert's consent was
clearly obtained and that there is no need for judicial inquiry into the best interests of the
children. The court relied on Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.16(2)(a). The court erred in
failing to grant Mr. Sievert's motion. Questions of jurisdiction and statutory interpretation
are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness, giving no particular deference to lower
court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 201 UT App 347, 37 P.3d
1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In re E.H. involves a mother who was seeking to be involved in a "best interest"
hearing for her natural son despite a relinquishment order being upheld by the District Court.
137 P.3d 809 (Utah 2006). Under section 78-30-4.16 of the Utah code a "best interests"
hearing would occur only after the petition for adoption may not be granted. Id. at 819.
Which means that if the relinquishment were valid, then there would be no need consider a
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custody, or "best interests" hearing. Id. The court went on to say, "[ajlthough the district
court's determination that the mother's relinquishment was lawful freed it of a duty to
conduct this custody hearing under section 78-30-4.16, that ruling did not relieve the court
of its statutory responsibility to conduct a meaningful inquiry into whether the proposed
adoption of E.H. was consistent with his best interests. That duty is assigned to the court
under the provisions of section 78-30-9, which directs the court to 'examine each person
appearing before it in accordance with this chapter, separately, and, if satisfied that the
interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, it shall enter a final decree of
adoption.'" Id. The court in Seiverts case did not conduct a "best interests" inquiry, which
could only be done if Seiverts did not have standing or the power to intervene. Id.
"In general, standing is available only to a person who has sustained some injury to
her legal, personal, or property rights. The district court believed that its determination that
the mother's relinquishment was lawful conclusively denied her standing in the subsequent
adoption hearing. The district court reasoned that because the relinquishment left the mother
with no right or interest that could be affected by the proceeding, she lacked standing to
participate in those proceedings. We need not rule today whether all of the mother's interests
in E.H. were extinguished; however, because even if we were to accept this line of reasoning
as true, the presence or absence of parental rights does not determine whether a person has
standing to intervene in an adoption proceeding." Id. at 819-20. Even if the court finds
Seiverts relinquishment valid, he could still find standing to intervene and present evidence
as to the "best interests" of his children.
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Intervention is the act by which a third party obtains standing to become a
party in a suit. It has been described as a method by which an outsider with
an interest in an action may enter and participate as a party. To justify
intervention, the party seeking intervention must demonstrate a direct interest
in the subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's rights may be
affected, for good or for ill. The requisite interest necessary to permit
intervention may arisefromthe intervenor's status or her circumstances. Rule
24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs intervention as
of right, describes the connection that must exist between a persons status or
circumstances and the lawsuit in order to justify intervention, stating:
When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by the
existing parties.
Id. at 820.
After discussing the statutory granting of standing to intervene the court stated
A mother, like E.H.'s mother, who has relinquished her parental rights does
not have a right to receive notice and is excluded from the class of persons
upon which the statute confers a right to intervene and present best interests
evidence. However, by merely extending to a particular class of persons an
express invitation to intervene in an adoption and present best interests
evidence, Utah Code section 78-30-4.13(11) does not foreclose the possibility
that other persons may, by reason of status or circumstance, also be eligible
to intervene and present relevant best interests evidence. We do not read
section 78-30-4.13(11) as restricting those who maybe eligible to intervene
in the adoption and present relevant best interests evidence to persons entitled
to notice. Rather, section 78-30-4.13(11) authorizes intervention to persons
who may "present evidence to the court relevant to t|ie best interest of the
child."
By expressly granting a right of intervention to other persons who have no
parental interest in an adoptee, Utah Code section 78-30-4.13(11) manifests
the unmistakable intention to ground standing to intervene on whether the
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prospective intervenor can demonstrate an interest in or relevant evidence
about the adoptee's best interests irrespective of parental status.
Id. at 820-21.
Seiverts contact with his children over the course of years and his payments of child
support likely give him the status and circumstance to satisfy the standing to intervene
and present "best interests" evidence.
Good language from the case is:
Our legislature has voiced a clear and consistent belief that the "best interest
of a child" is defined to a substantial degree by the presence of a prompt,
permanent, and secure parental attachment. As we said in Hardinger "The
legislature has expressly provided that 'the state has a compelling interest in
providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children ... [and] in
preventing the disruption of adoptive placements/ and 'adoptive children
have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements.' "
Id. at 823.
Because of the time spent with his children it can easily be argued that Seiverts has
"a prompt, permanent, and secure parental attachment" with his children.
POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND QUASIESTOPPEL, WAIVER AND LACHES DO NOT PREVENT
ENFORCEMENT OF APPELLANT'S RELINQUISHMENT

The court erred in failing to grant Mr. Sievert's motion to reconsider and vacate.
Findings: Judge Hilder foxind that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not prevent
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enforcement of Mr. Sievert's relinquishment. Furthermore, Judge Hilder found that from the
record before him there is no indication that Mr. Sievert's post relinquishment behavior has
led to an advantage on their behalf or disadvantage to Mr. Sieverts. Furthermore, the court
found that Mr. Sievert's continued post relinquishment contact as atypical and the court did
not find that it invokes principles of estoppel so as to defeat the plain language of the statute
and the terms of the relinquishment itself. Marshaled evidence supporting findings: Judge
Hilder made these findings by determining that Mr. Sieverts had no present parental status
or rights and cannot obtain such rights by invoking an equitable doctrine. Questions of
jurisdiction and statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness,
giving no particular deference to lower court decisions. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. InsureRite. Inc., 201 UT App 347,37 P.3d 1202; State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38,39 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
Judge Hilder indicated that Mr. Sieverts estoppel claims were foreclosed by the lack
of any evidence of inconsistent statements, acts, or admissions by petitioner and that the
mother's position has been consistent throughout; seeking to bar any future claim for custody
by Mr. Sieverts thereby allowing her the freedom to remarry and permit a future spouse to
adopt the children. Furthermore, he made his finding on the basis that Mr. Sieverts provided
no evidence or persuasive argument that he relied to his detriment upon petitioner's
allegations, representations or actions when he signed his unequivocal relinquishment. Judge
Hilder found that Mr. Sieverts was aware of the relinquishment, and was deemed to have
understood the effects thereof. Judge Hilder erred in making these findings based on the fact
that Mr. Sieverts had no opportunity to provide evidence or testify in the hearing. In making
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these findings Judge Hilder relied on Celebrity Club, Inc. v. The Liquor Control Comm'n,
602 P.2d 689,694 (Utah 1979) and Bott v. J.R. Shea Company, 299 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir.
2000). Quoting, Stinnett v. Colorado Interstate Gas. Co., 227 F.3d 247,258 (5th Cir. 2000)
and C&G Inc. v. Canyon Highway District 75 P.3d 194,199 (Idaho 2003) (citing, Floyd v.
Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 52 P.3d 863, 871 (2002)
A fit parents relinquishment for adoption should be set aside "for fraud, undue
influence and for a good cause shown

" In re Adoption of K, 465 P.2d 541,542 (Utah

1970) "or other grounds which would justify release from the obligations of any contract."
Matter of S., 572 P.2d 1371,1374 (Utah 1977) quoting In re Adoption of F, 488 P.2d 130,
133 (Utah 1971).
In making his determination regarding equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel Judge
Hilder failed to consider the jurisdictional requirements and implications as well as Judge
Peuler's ruling and order, (see above, Point I). Judge Hilder also ruled that Mr. Sieverts'
relinquishment "was effective when signed" but failed to consider or understand that Mr.
Sieverts' rights and responsibilities are not terminated until the adoption decree is entered
under Utah law. (See above Point II). Subsequent to the divorce, Mr. Sieverts continued to
visit with the children and pay child support. Mr. Sieverts visited the children significantly
more than he was entitled to under the Decree of Divorce and continued to pay child support.
In addition to Mr. Sieverts' discussions with Appellee and Appellee's actions, Mr. Sieverts'
had a very reasonable expectation that visitation would continue in accordance with the
parties' Decree of Divorce based on Judge Peuler's October 15, 2005 ruling.
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Because of Judge Hilder's err in not immediately granting Mr. Sieverts' Motion to
Vacate, Mr. Sieverts has been deprived of any visitation with his children as provided in the
Decree and subsequent order by Judge Peuler. The improper termination of visitation
includes the deprivation of developing a relationship and bond with his children and enjoying
the love and affection that comes with such relationships. Mr. Sieverts has continued to pay
child support, yet lost out on the reduction in child support he was entitled to under the
Decree for extended visitation pursuant to U.C.A. 78-45-7.11. Mr. Sieverts was required to
retain counsel and spend unnecessary time and money arguing his motion that should have
been immediately granted. Mr. Sieverts has been severely disadvantaged because of the
courts improper action and Appellee has been greatly advantaged.
CONCLUSION
The trial judge erred when he did not immediately grant Mr. Sieverts' Motion to
Reconsider or Vacate. The trial judge erred when he denied Mr. Sieverts' Motion to
Reconsider or Vacate. The trial judge erred when he accepted Appellee's Petition to
Determine Parental Rights. The trial judge erred when he signed the Order Terminating
Rights without notice and due process to Appellant. This court should reverse the trial
court's Ruling and remand with instructions to vacate the relinquishment and Order
Terminating Rights and bar Appellees from enforcing the reliiiquishment on these grounds.
The trial judge erred by denying Mr. Sieverts his parental rights. The trial court should have
set aside Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment and waiver for adoption because the court did not have
grounds and jurisdiction to consider the matter and enter the Order on April 30,2007. The
Court's Ruling improperly overturned Judge Peuler's Ruling where she had already denied
25

the Relinquishment and Waiver and ruled the original Decree of Divorce remain in full force
and effect. Mr. Sieverts relied on this and continued his relationship with his children,
including paying child support and spending time with the children in excess of that allowed
in the parties' decree. After Judge Peuler rejected the attempted relinquishment Mr. Sieverts
was justified in believing it was thereafter a nullity, or in the least he would receive notice
and due process. This court should reverse the trial courts Ruling and Order Terminating
Rights and remand with instructions to grant Mr. Sieverts' motion and vacate the
relinquishment and restore Appellant's parental rights in accordance with the parties Decree
of Divorce and Judge Peuler's Order of October 15, 2005.

Respectfully submitted this 16th day of January, 2009.
KING & KING

By: W ^ ^ W JOSHIJ^ F. KING
/
Attorneys for Appellant (
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